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On July 25, 2002, the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing
Limited published a consultation paper entitled "Proposed
Amendments to the Listing Rules Relating to Initial Listing and
Continuing Listing Eligibility and Cancellation of Listing
Procedures" (Consultation Paper), which set out proposals for the
delisting of shares in Part C, entitled "Continuing Listing
Eligibility Criteria."' Although this section set out eleven broad
quantitative and qualitative criteria for the delisting of shares, the
focus was centered on the minimum share price criterion.' This
criterion deemed the issuer in default when its share price traded
below Hong Kong Dollar (HKD$) 0.50, approximately United
States Dollar (USD$) 0.065, for more than thirty consecutive
trading days.3
The following day, some HKD$10 billion (approximately
USD$1.3 billion) was wiped off the market capitalization as
investors sold off their holdings of penny stocks.4 This prompted
the unprecedented action of the removal of Part C of the
Consultation Paper on July 28, 2002.'
This article examines the proposal to delist penny stocks.
While agreeing with the general principles and objectives of the
proposal, the author nonetheless finds fault with the proposed
mode of implementation. This paper concludes with a proposal
for an alternative framework that is more consistent with the
government's aspirations to make Hong Kong the paragon of
corporate governance.
I. Introduction
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 instilled an enhanced
appreciation of the lagging standards of corporate governance in
1 See HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., CONSULTATION PAPER ON
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LISTING RULES RELATING TO INITIAL LISTING &
CONTINUING LISTING ELIGIBILITY & CANCELLATION OF LISTING PROCEDURES (2002),
available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/consul/paper/HKEX%20Cover%/ 2OJul.pdf.
2 Id. at 9-15.
3 Id. at9.
4 ROBERT G. KOTEWALL & GORDON C.K. KWONG, Gov'T OF THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION, REPORT OF THE PANEL OF INQUIRY ON THE PENNY STOCKS
INCIDENT, 109-21 (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/info/pennystock-
e.htm.
5 Id.
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Asia.6 In particular, it brought to the foreground the common
occurrence of practices that allowed companies to engage in
excessive over-leveraging, a number of which were aided
implicitly by state guarantees.7 The concepts of transparency,
disclosure, and accountability were largely ignored in the lead-up
to the crisis, as investors assumed a short-term outlook to derive
increasing profits from the steadily rising regional financial
markets.8 The absence of governance was evident from the
incidence of capricious decision-making, the shifting of assets
within corporate groups, the undertaking of transactions without
proper disclosure, and poor financial management by directors of
these companies.9
The volatility of the financial markets prompted the
government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(HKSAR) to canvass a number of significant proposals"° that were
based on two fundamental principles: the maintenance of the
reputation of the territory as an open and external-oriented
international financial center and the preservation of the linked
exchange rate system." This subsequently led to a proposal to
6 See generally Marra Faccio et al., Dividends and Expropriation, 91 AM. ECON.
REv. 54 (2001); Simon Johnson, et at., Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial
Crisis, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 141 (2000).
7 See generally Faccio et al., supra note 6; Johnson et al., supra note 6.
8 See generally Faccio et al., supra note 6; Johnson et al., supra note 6.
9 See generally Faccio et al., supra note 6; Johnson et al., supra note 6.
10 See GOv'T OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION, REPORT ON FIN.
MARKETS (1998), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/eindex.htm.
I I ld. As with its American counterpart, the Hong Kong Dollar (HKD$) is
divisible into 100 cents. The linked exchange rate was introduced in October 1983
following a period of uncertainty surrounding the issue of the handover of Hong Kong
by the United Kingdom to the People's Republic of China. GOV'T OF THE HONG KONG
SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION, HONG KONG YEARBOOK, at
http://www.info.gov.hk/yearbook/2002/ehtml/e04-11 .htm (last updated Aug. 21, 2004).
The linked exchange rate provides for the issue and the redemption of bank notes at the
fixed exchange rate of HKD$7.80 to USD$ 1, hence the use of the term "dollar peg" or
"linked exchange rate." See generally Rajanet al., Choice of Exchange Rate Regime:
Currency Board (Hong Kong) or Monitoring Band (Singapore)?, 41 AUST. ECON.
PAPERS 538-56 (2002) (considering and contrasting the economies of Hong Kong and
Singapore), at http://www.ips.org.sg/pub/wpl2.pdf. This system is entirely market-
driven with any expansion or contraction in the monetary base of the domestic currency,
namely the Hong Kong Dollar, resulting in an automatic decrease or increase in the
interest rate respectively. Id.
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consolidate the structure of the capital markets in the HKSAR,
which at that time was comprised of two member-owned, or
mutualized, exchanges and three clearing houses. 2
The members of both the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong
Limited and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange Limited facilitated
this move by voting overwhelmingly in favor of demutualizing
and merging their exchanges and clearing houses in September
1999."3 A new entity, the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing
Limited (HKEx), was incorporated to allow the members of the
stock and futures exchanges to either swap their existing shares for
those of the HKEx or, alternatively, to receive a cash payment as
consideration. 4 The latter thus became a holding company whose
subsidiaries included the stock and futures exchanges as well as
their clearing houses. 5 With the demutualization, trading rights
were separated from ownership so that the holding of shares in the
HKEx was no longer a prerequisite for trading on either the stock
or futures exchange.' 6 The HKEx subsequently became only the
third exchange in the world to be publicly listed when its shares
commenced trading on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in June
2000.17
12 FIN. SERVICES BUREAU, HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD.:
REINFORCING HONG KONG'S POSITION AS A GLOBAL FIN. CENTRE (1999) (policy paper
written by the Financial Services Bureau of the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region), at http://www.info.gov.hk/fstb/fsb/topical/doc/report-e.doc.
13 See CHEE KEONG Low, FIN. MARKETS IN HONG KONG 46-51 (2000) for an
overview of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited and the Hong Kong Futures
Exchange Limited.
14 Id.
1S Id.
16 Id.
17 See id. at 51-67 (commentary on the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing
Limited). See generally HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., at http://
www.hkex.com.hk (last visited Sept. 24, 2004) (providing general information about the
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited). The Stockholm Exchange in Sweden was
demutualized in 1992 and subsequently acquired by the OM Group, a publicly listed
company, in 1997, while the Australian Stock Exchange, the Singapore Exchanges, and
the London Stock Exchange were listed on their own exchanges in 1998, 2000, and 2001
respectively. For a historical overview of these exchanges, see OMX, at
www.omgroup.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2004) (owns and operates the largest integrated
securities market in Northern Europe and is a provider of marketplace services and
solutions for the financial and energy markets); Australian Stock Exchange, at
www.asx.com.au/shareholder/13/asxoverview-as3.shtm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004);
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The foregoing arrangement was deemed necessary to ensure
that the HKEx would have no controlling shareholder when it
became a public listed company, though it was still significantly
controlled by the government of the HKSAR. s Although the
government does not hold any shares in the HKEx, it nonetheless
retains effective control of the fifteen-member board of directors
through the appointment of no more than eight "Public Interest
Directors" by the Financial Secretary.19
II. The Regulatory Framework in the HKSAR
The HKSAR adopted a three-tiered system of regulation of
financial markets in which functions are defined as "macro
policy," "watchdog," and "operational."2  Under the new
ministerial system of government, adopted on July 1, 2002,
responsibility for the regulation of the banking and securities
industries and oversight of the governance of companies,
provident funds as well as the insurance sector, falls within the
purview of the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury.21
http://info.sgx/SGXWebCORPCOM.nsf/newDOCNAME/BackgroundOn-SGX;
London Stock Exchange: Our History, at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-
gb/about/cooverview/history.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
18 See GOV'T OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION, SECURITIES & FUTURES
ORDINANCE § 77 (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov.hk/
blisind.nsf/CurAllEngDoc?OpenView&Start=568&Count=30&Expand=568#568
[hereinafter SECURITIES & FUTURES ORDINANCE]. HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING
LTD., Articles of Association of the HKEx, Art. 90, available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk. (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
19 See SECURITIES & FUTURES ORDINANCE, supra note 18. A high degree of
government control was deemed necessary to both protect the integrity as well as to
facilitate the further development of its financial markets, the latter of which is enshrined
in Article 109 of the Basic Law of the HKSAR. See GOV'T OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMIN. REGION, HONG KONG: THE FACTS - THE BASIC LAW, available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/hkfacts/baslaw.pdf (last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
20 See KOTEWALL & KWONG, supra note 4, at 13-33.
21 See CHIEF EXECUTIVE CHEE WAH TUNG, GOV'T OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMIN. REGION, RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FIN. SECRETARY & THE SECRETARY FOR THE
FIN. SERVICES & THE TREASURY (H.K.) (2003), at http://www.info.gov.hk/fso/pdf/fs-
sfst.e.pdf. In response to the uncertainties that arose during the penny stock debacle of
July 2002 and to minimize the degree of overlap, the responsibilities of the Financial
Secretary and the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury have been delineated
since June 2003. See id. The Honorable Tung Chee Wah, Chief Executive (CE) of the
HKSAR, sought to establish a scheme of governance whereby three principal senior
officials, namely the Chief Secretary, the Financial Secretary, and the Secretary for
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Sitting at the apex of the regulatory regime, the Secretary is
entrusted with the responsibility of formulating and implementing
such policies as are necessary to enhance the standing of the
HKSAR as an international financial center.2
The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) occupies the
next highest tier.23 Pursuant to section three of the Securities and
Futures Ordinance, the SFC is an independent statutory body
responsible not only for administering the laws governing the
securities and futures markets in the HKSAR, but also for
facilitating and encouraging the development of these markets.24
The policy-making body of the SFC is comprised of a Chairman
and seven other directors, all of whom are appointed for fixed
terms by the Chief Executive of the HKSAR.25 The composition
Justice, and eleven ministers with policy portfolios are appointed to sit on the Executive
Council. The quasi-cabinet of the HKSAR, together with five other members without
portfolios, collectively advises the CE on policy regarding the spectrum of public
administration. See generally AUSTRALIAN Gov'T DEPT., HONG KONG COUNTRY - BRIEF
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE (2004), at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/
hongkong/hongkongbfief.html. This scheme is designed to enhance accountability,
albeit singularly to the CE rather than to serve the public. Id. Nevertheless, public
pressure over the perceived performance of some senior officials has led to the
resignation of three ministers, namely the Financial Secretary and the Secretary for
Security in July 2003 and the Secretary for Health, Welfare and Food a year later. See
Press Release, HKSAR Government Information Center, Chief Executive Accepts
Resignations of Two Principal Officials, HKSAR Government Information Center (July
16, 2003), at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/brandhk/0716253.htm; Press Release,
HKSAR Government Information Center, Statement by Permanent Secretary for Health,
Welfare and Food (July 7, 2004), at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200407/07/
0707356.htm.
22 See TUNG, supra note 21; KOTEWALL & KWONG, supra note 4, at 24 (describing
the responsibilities of the Secretary for Financial Services).
23 Introducing the Securities and Futures Commission, at http://www.hksfc.
org.hk/eng/pressreleases/html/publications/intro-sfc.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
See also KOTEWALL & KWONG, supra note 4, at 19-21 (describing the functions of the
Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission).
24 KOTEWALL & KWONG, supra note 4, at 19-21 (describing the functions of the
Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission). See also Introducing the Securities
and Futures Commission, supra note 23 (explaining the organization of the Securities
and Futures Commission).
25 See SECURITIES & FUTURES ORDINANCE (SFO), supra note 18. The number of
directors must not be less than eight with the majority being non-executive directors. Id.
The Legislative Council of Hong Kong passed the SFO on March 13, 2002 to
consolidate eleven securities and futures related ordinances to provide for a more
streamlined system of regulation with appropriate levels of sanctions. Id. The ordinance
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of the board is divided equally between executive and non-
executive directors, with the Chairman being amongst the
former.26  The principal functions of the SFC include the
maintenance of market integrity, the enforcement of the relevant
ordinances and subsidiary legislation, the protection of investors,
and the enhancement of the reputation of the financial markets of
the HKSAR.27 The SFC is bound by a set of statutory regulatory
objectives which are as follows:28
" to maintain and promote the fairness, efficiency,
competitiveness, transparency, and orderliness of the
securities and futures industry;
" to promote understanding by the public of the operation and
functioning of the securities and futures industry;
" to provide protection for members of the public investing in or
holding financial products;
" to minimize crime and misconduct in the securities and
futures industry;
" to reduce systemic risks in the securities and futures industry;
and
" to assist the Financial Secretary in maintaining the financial
stability of Hong Kong by taking appropriate steps in relation
to the securities and futures industry.29
At the front-line is the HKEx, whose responsibility
encompasses the operational administration of the "Rules
Governing the Listing of Securities on the Stock Exchange of
was gazetted on March 28, 2002 and became fully operative as of April 1, 2003
following the enactment of the requisite subsidiary legislation. Id.
26 See Introducing the Securities and Futures Commission, supra note 23
(explaining the organization of the Securities and Futures Commission); KOTEWALL &
KWONG, supra note 4, at 25 (describing the composition of the Securities and Futures
Commission statutory body).
27 See Introducing the Securities and Futures Exchange, supra note 23 (listing the
functions of the Securities and Futures Commission).
28 SECURITIES & FUTURES ORDINANCE, supra note 18, § 4. The powers of the SFC
are extensive if they are exercised in the carrying out of its functions as it is empowered
to "perform any function conferred by or under any other Ordinance" with the rubric of
securities regulation. Id. §§ 3 & 5.
29 See HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., REGULATORY FRAMEWORK &
RULES, at http://www.hkex.com.hk (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
2004]
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Hong Kong" (Listing Rules).3' They set out the contractual
obligations that are imposed upon the stock exchange, the issuers,
and their advisers for the seeking and maintenance of listings on
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK).3" To enhance
regulatory efficiency through the minimization of overlaps, the
HKEx signed a number of memoranda of understanding with the
SFC to define their respective roles and functions. 32  The SFC
retains the responsibility for detecting market misconduct with
statutory implications and for the prudential regulation of the
members of the stock and futures exchanges. 33  The HKEx
maintains surveillance over trading operations and risk
30 See HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., RULES GOVERNING THE LISTING
OF SECURITIES ON THE GROWTH ENTERPRISE MARKET OF THE HONG KONG EXCHANGES &
CLEARING LTD., at http://www.hkgem.comlistingrules/e-default.htm (last visited Oct.
10, 2004) (for rules that apply to issues seeking a listing on the Growth Enterprise
Market (GEM)) [hereinafter LISTING RULES]. The GEM is sometimes conveniently
referred to as the "Second Board" by commentators from within the region. See e.g.,
Foster Wong, More GEM Firms Likely to Jump, THE ST&ARD (Apr. 12, 2004) (referring
to the GEM as the "second board") available at http://www.thestandard.
com.hk/news detail_frame.cfm?articleid=46633&intcatid=l. This is because of its
objective of providing an alternative listing mechanism for companies that do not meet
the stricter quantitative and/or qualitative requirements for a listing on the Main Board.
See generally Growth Enterprise Market (for further information the GEM), at
http://www.hkgem.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2004). The scope of this article will focus
exclusively on the Main Board and its Listing Rules.
31 SECURITIES & FUTURES ORDINANCE, supra note 18, § 27. Section 27 of the SFO
provides the SEHK with "the exclusive right to establish, operate and maintain a stock
market in Hong Kong." Id. This has since been incorporated into Part 1, Schedule 1 of
the SFO. Id.
32 HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., MEMOR&UM OF UNDERST&ING
GOVERNING LISTING MATTERS BETWEEN SECURITIES & FUTURE COMM'N & THE STOCK
EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG LTD. (2003), available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/regdoc/regdoc.htm [hereinafter LISTING MATTERS] (providing
full details and copies of memoranda signed between the parties relating to the
governance of list matters, SFC oversight, supervision of exchange participants, and
market surveillance).
33 See id. Although demutualized, the members of the stock and futures exchanges
as of the date of the establishment of the HKEx had their trading rights in the respective
markets "grandfathered" to ensure continuity and to minimize disruptions that may have
arisen as a consequence of the merger. The maintenance of these rights is subject to the
continued meeting of the licensing requirements of the SFC as well as any further
conditions that may be imposed by the SFC and/or HKEx. See HONG KONG EXCHANGES
& CLEARING LTD., STOCK EXCHANGE TRADING RIGHTS, at www.hkex.com.hk/rule/
exrule/chap-3a eng.doc (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
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management areas where it has a comparative advantage as a
business-oriented commercial organization. 4
As a for-profit company, the HKEx is duty-bound to maximize
profits for its shareholders.35 Its revenue is principally derived
from the initial and annual listing fees, the trading levy imposed
on securities and futures transactions, as well as any interest
income that may be derived.36 To avoid any conflicts of interest,
the SFC is responsible for all matters associated with the
continued listing of the HKEx on the SEHK.37 In short, the SFC
assumes the supervision of issues that would normally have been
dealt with by the relevant divisions of the exchange insofar as
these pertain to the listing status of the HKEx.3 8 This arrangement
allows the SFC to assume a broader, more active role as the
principal regulator, especially since it is perceived to be more
impartial than the HKEx when it pertains to matters which conflict
with the business interests of the latter.39
Although the system of regulating financial markets is
ostensibly three-tiered, it is nonetheless evident that the
government of the HKSAR retains a significant degree of
control.4" Apart from setting the macro policies through the
Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, the Chief
Executive of the HKSAR also appoints all the directors of the
SFC.41 Additionally, it approves of the "public interest" directors
who, by their number, effectively control the board of the HKEx.
42
34 See KOTEWALL & KWONG, supra note 4, at 15-28.
35 See generally LISTING MATTERS, supra note 32 (describing respective roles and
responsibilities of the SFC, SEHK, and the HKEx).
36 See KOTEWALL & KWONG, supra note 4, at 15-28.
37 Id.
38 See HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., MEMOR&UM OF UNDERST&ING
FOR THE LISTING OF HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD. ON THE STOCK
EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG (Aug. 22, 2001), available at http://www.hkex.com/regdoc
/regdoc/mou/MOU%20(New)%20final21-8-01_conformed%20copy.doc [hereinafter
LISTING OF HONG KONG EXCHANGES].
39 See generally id. (describing the roles and responsibilities of the SFC). See also
KOTEWALL & KWONG, supra note 4, at 15-28 (describing the respective roles of the
government and the SFC in regard to the Hong Kong Exchange).
40 See KOTEWALL & KWONG, supra note 4, at 15-28.
41 Id.
42 Id.
2004]
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While the government has professed to adopt a hands-off approach
to market regulation, the existing arrangement has nonetheless
been criticized for allowing for a departure from the stated norm.
4 3
III. The Penny Stock Debate: Issues and Chronology
On July 25, 2002, the SFC held a press conference to release
the principal findings of its research paper titled "Quality of
Markets and the Case for More Effective Delisting Mechanism.""
The key findings are summarized as follows:
* Although the SEHK is the tenth largest in the world, as
measured in terms of market capitalization at the end of
2001, it nonetheless does not enjoy the same status when
assessed by valuation, weighing in world portfolio
investments and liquidity.45
* At the end of 2001, the weighted average price/earning ratio
for the thirty-three constituent companies on the Hang Seng
Index was fifteen. This lags significantly behind its blue
chip counterparts in London (thirty-four), New York (thirty)
and Australia (twenty-four).4 6
* The SEHK has a high incidence of stocks with low nominal
values.47 Twelve percent of its companies on the Main
43 See Byron S. J. Weng, Recovery Will Come, But Only Slowly, HONG KONG
UPDATE (Dec. 1998-Jan. 1999), available at www.csis.org/asia/hkupdate/hkl4weng.
html. An example of this is the unprecedented intervention in the stock and futures
markets over a two-week period starting August 14, 1998 and culminating with the
government purchasing more than HKD$118 billion or about USD$15 billion worth of
shares that were the constituents of the benchmark Hang Seng Index. Id. While this
intervention brought about significant losses to speculators who attempted to capitalize
on the uncertainties in the financial markets during the East Asian financial crisis, it was
achieved at the cost of putting a dent on the reputation of the HKSAR as a free economy
that promotes a policy of positive non-intervention. Id.
44 See Press Release, Securities and Futures Commission, Research Paper on
Quality of Market and the Case for More Effective Delisting Mechanism (July 25, 2002),
available at http://www.hksf.org.hk/eng/press-releases/htmlpressrelease/02/02prl49.
htm. Although co-authored by staff of the Corporate Finance Division and the Research
Department of the SFC, the research paper expressly states that the findings therein do
"not necessarily represent the views of the Securities and Futures Commission." Id.
45 CORPORATE FINANCE Div. & RESEARCH DEPT., SECURITIES & FUTURE COMM'N,
QUALITY OF MARKET & THE CASE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DELISTING MECHANISM, SFC
QUARTERLY BULLETIN, at 21-32 (2002), available at http://www.hksf.org.hk.
46 Id. at21.
47 Id. The ratio of the turnover velocity to the market capitalization is the lowest of
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Board were capitalized at less than HKD$100 million, or
USD$13 million,48 which would not have qualified them for
an initial listing.49 In addition, approximately eight of every
ten of such companies incurred losses.5"
* There were 107 penny stocks as of May 31, 2002, defined in
the research paper as shares which trade at or below HKD 10
cents or about USD1.3 cents.51
The prevalence of penny stocks was viewed as being
inconsistent with international standards and gave rise to three
main policy implications.52 First, the pricing mechanism of the
trading system works less efficiently for penny stocks compared to
those with higher prices.53 This provides opportunities for market
manipulation as a few transactions would usually suffice to cause
substantial fluctuations in the price of these securities.54 Second,
the absence of an effective delisting mechanism deprives
stockholders of an orderly exit option with which to cash in their
investments. 5 Third, an accumulation of a large number of
underperforming penny stocks is perceived to reflect poorly upon
the standing and reputation of an exchange.56 This may, in turn,
lead to an avoidance of the exchange by otherwise suitable listing
all major markets studied. Id. In fact, the "relatively low turnover velocity and the low
weighting in the MSCI index correlate to the low free float of Hong Kong stocks." Id.
48 Id. at 22. while this requirement is relatively low compared with the
requirement for applicants seeking a listing on the New York Stock Exchange (USD$60
million) or on the Nasdaq SmallCap (USD$50 million), it is nonetheless significantly
higher than the minimum required by the Australian Stock Exchange (A$10 million or
about USD$7.3 million) and the London Stock Exchange (GBP700,000 or about
USD$1.2 million). See New York Stock Exchange, at http://www.nyse.com (last visited
Oct. 10, 2004); Australian Stock Exchange, at http://www.asx.com.au/shareholder/13/
asxoverview.as3.shtm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004), http://info.sgx/SGXWebCORP
COM.nsf/newDOCNAME/Background_On_SGX; London Stock Exchange: Our
History, at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/en-gb/about/cooverview/history.htm
(last visited Sept. 24, 2004).
49 CORPORATE FINANCE Div. & RESEARCH DEPT., supra note 45, at 22.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 24.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 27.
56 Id.
2004]
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candidates and, in the long term, affect the liquidity of the market.
Later that day, the HKEx published the Consultation Paper,57
and the media focused immediately and almost exclusively on Part
C, which sought to cancel the listing of securities that were traded
on the Main Board of the SEHK if they failed to meet specified
criteria.58 Although eleven broad quantitative and qualitative
criteria were specified, the minimum share price criterion was
highlighted.59 This provision deemed the issuer in default when its
share price trades below HKD$0.50, or about USD$0.065, for
more than thirty trading days.6" Such a determination could lead
to the delisting of the shares unless specified remedial actions,
including the consolidation of shares or reverse stock-splits, are
taken.61
The proximity of the release of the two documents gave rise to
the presumption of an agenda to remove penny stocks from the
Hong Kong markets.62 It is reasonably safe to assume that the
reasons differ between the SFC and the HKEx. The SFC has
always professed its aspiration to make the regulation of capital
markets in the HKSAR on par with international standards.63
Nevertheless, with the introduction of the more politically inclined
ministerial system of governance, it is not unreasonable to infer
that the release of the research report by the SFC may have been
expedited at the express or implied instigation of the Financial
Secretary and/or the Secretary for Financial Services and the
57 HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 1.
58 Id. at 73-100.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 83-84.
61 Id. See infra Part IV.
62 See Chairman Charles Lee, Remarks at the Government Press Conference on
Market Consultation Relating to Listing Eligibility (July 28, 2002), available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/020728news.htm; HONG KONG EXCHANGES &
CLEARING LTD., REPORT ON MODIFIED STRUCTURES FOR LISTING MATTERS (July 24,
2002), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/020724news.htm
[hereinafter Modified Structures for Listing Matters].
63 See, e.g., Press Release, Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, Hong Kong to
Implement Securities and Futures Ordinance On April 1, (Mar. 31, 2003), available at
http://www.hongkong.org/press/ny_033103.htm (statement by Secretary for Financial
Services and Treasury, Frederick Ma, that the SFO will strengthen and enhance Hong
Kong's status as an international financial center).
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Treasury.64
The interest of the HKEx is likely to have been consistent with
its objectives as a for-profit company. Its role as a front-line
market regulator is, at least in the short-term, a cost center with
minimal, if any, immediate financial returns. 65  This is especially
true with the regulation of penny stocks since the corporate
transactions that they undertake are usually large relative to their
size, which necessitates various levels of approvals to ensure that
the interests of shareholders are protected.6  It is also not
uncommon for these companies to run into financial difficulty that
requires the undertaking of corporate restructuring.67  This
increases the cost of regulation because corporate restructuring
involves voluminous documentation from proposal through
implementation.68 In this context, it is more cost effective for the
HKEx to delist penny stocks given the direct implications for its
profitability as a listed entity.69
It is often said that a week is a long time in politics.7" The
64 Id. See Lee, supra note 62. At a press conference on July 24, 2002, the
Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury announced that he had jointly reviewed
the new listing regime with the SFC and the HKEx. REPORT ON MODIFIED STRUCTURES
FOR LISTING MATTERS, supra note 62. He also informed the media that the "HKEx will
shortly conduct a public consultation on a proposed framework for continued listing and
delisting arrangements." Id. This appeared to conflict with the subsequent assertion by
the Financial Secretary, on July 28, 2002, that the HKEx had not consulted the
government on the issue although, at that time, government appointees comprised the
majority of the board of directors of the HKEx. Lee, supra note 62. To deny any
knowledge, whether actual or implied, under the circumstances would suggest the total
absence of oversight and would, in turn, run against the fundamental concept of
accountability.
65 See David Webb, The Delisting Fiasco, WEBB-SITE.COM (2002) at
http://www.webb-site.com/articles/delisting.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004); David
Webb, PIPSI Submission, WEBB-SITE.COM (2002) at http://www.webb-site.com/
articles/pipsi.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
66 See Webb, The Delisting Fiasco, supra note 65; Webb, PIPSI Submission, supra
note 65.
67 See Webb, The Delisting Fiasco, supra note 65; Webb, PIPSI Submission, supra
note 65.
68 See Webb, The Delisting Fiasco, supra note 65; Webb, PIPSI Submission, supra
note 65.
69 See Webb, The Delisting Fiasco, supra note 65; Webb, PIPSI Submission, supra
note 65.
70 This quote is credited to Sir Harold Wilson,. the former Prime Minister of the
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adage may also hold true for financial markets in the HKSAR as is
made evident from the following chronology of events sparked by
the release of the Consultation Paper by the HKEx:7'
July 26 The share prices of the penny stocks collapse with an
estimated HKD$ 10 billion, or approximately USD$1.3
billion, wiped off the market capitalization of the
SEHK. The prices of individual shares dropped by as
much as 88% from their previous close as investors
rushed to dump their penny stock holdings.72
July 27 Following a clarification a day earlier, the HKEx
announces an extension of the proposed consultation
period from August 31, 2002 to October 31, 2002. 73
July 28 The Chairman of the HKEx announces the withdrawal
of the delisting proposals following a series of
meetings with the Secretary for Financial Services and
the Treasury, the Chairman of the SFC, and market
participants.7 4 A new set of proposals is planned to be
published in its place at the end of October 2002.75
July 29 In the wake of persistent public outcry, the
aforementioned individuals are summoned by the
Financial Affairs Panel of the Legislative Council of
the HKSAR 76 to a meeting on July 31 to explain their
United Kingdom. See, e.g., Arik Hesseldahl, Best Politics Blogs, Forbes.com, Feb. 12,
2004, at http://www.forbes.com/business/2OO4/O2/12/cx ah_0212politicsblogs.html
71 KOTEWALL & KWONG, supra note 4, at 100-22.
72 Id. at 102. The prices of more than 220 stocks, representing almost a third of all
companies listed on the Main Board of the SEHK, fell by a minimum of 5% on the day
in question. Id.
73 Id. at 104.
74 Id. at 105. The announcement is unprecedented because it was made on a
Sunday. Allegedly, the haste was necessitated by the potential for a run on a number of
brokerages that had engaged in margin lending. KOTEWALL & KWONG, supra note 4, at
121. The collapse of the prices of the penny stocks exposed these brokerages to
potentially significant financial difficulties especially if the securities continued on their
downward trend. Id. This could have the effect of disrupting the orderly settlement of
trades and consequently affect the confidence of investors. Id.
75 See Lee, supra note 62.
76 See HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL TODAY (2004), available at http://www.legco.gov
/hk/english/index.htm. The Legislative Council of the HKSAR, or LegCo, has
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respective roles in the "penny stocks crash."77  The
prices of penny stocks improve but generally fail to
fully recover to their levels prior to the release of the
Consultation Paper by the HKEx as uncertainty
persists."
July 30 The SFC launches an investigation into the penny
stock crash to determine whether market manipulation
was the cause.79 Particular emphasis is directed at
allegations that some brokers had colluded to engineer
the plunge in the prices of penny stocks to exploit the
uncertainties surrounding the issue and create panic
selling amongst investors.8 °
July 31 Preempting the call for the establishment of an official
Commission of Inquiry, the Financial Secretary
exercises his administrative prerogative to establish a
two-man Panel of Inquiry into the Penny Stock
Incident.81 Although definitive answers proved elusive
responsibility for enacting legislation, controlling public expenditure, and monitoring of
government by putting forward questions of pubic interest. Id. It holds two major
debates in each legislative session focused on the government policies as announced in
the annual Policy Address by the Chief Executive of the HKSAR as well as on the
annual Appropriation Bill that is tabled by the Financial Secretary in his Budget Speech.
Id. The LegCo is currently comprised of sixty members, thirty of whom are directly
elected from geographical constituencies under a proportional system of representation
which covers the whole territory of the HKSAR. Id. The remaining thirty are elected by
the functional constituencies that have much narrower voter bases, some of which
number less than 100 electors. Id. See, for example, http://www.civic-exchange.org/
n_pub_cont_04.htm for some discussion on various aspects of the electoral system in
Hong Kong and http://www.info.gov.hk/cab/cab-review/eng/index.html for updates on
the progress of constitutional development in Hong Kong.
77 KOTEWALL & KwONG, supra note 4, at 106-07.
78 Id. at 106-07.
79 Id. at 107.
80 Id.
81 See How Events Unfold, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Hong Kong), Sept. 11, 2002,
at N4; see also At the Crossroads, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Hong Kong), Nov. 8, 2002,
at S1 (discussing the two-man inquiry created to investigate the penny stock crash). The
terms of reference for the Panel of Inquiry included a review of the arrangements for the
preparation and release of the Consultation Paper. See KOTEWALL & KwONG, supra note
4. The Panel of Inquiry had no real power at law to call for evidence or to protect those
who provide evidence, and its establishment raised conflicts of interest, given that the
actions and/or omissions of the Financial Secretary may itself be a subject of the inquiry.
Webb, The Delisting Fiasco, supra note 65; Webb, PIPS! Submission, supra note 65.
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at times, the Financial Services Panel82 of the
Legislative Council subjects the Secretary for Financial
Services and the Treasury,83 the Chairman of the SFC,
and the Chairman and Chief Executive of the HKEx to
intense questioning.84 The various officials extend
their apologies for "underestimating" the market
reaction to the delisting proposals."
August 1 As the Chief Executive expresses his support for the
Panel of Inquiry,86 public pressure grows for the
Chairman of the SFC and the Chief Executive of the
HKEx to resign from their respective roles in the
handling of the penny stock issue.87 Victims of the
penny stock crash announce their intention to initiate
legal action against regulatory bodies for compensation
Despite these reservations, it is to the credit of its authors, Robert Kotewall and Gordon
Kwong, that the report was reasonably well received.
82 See Enoch Yiu, Legislators Inviting Comments on Penny Stocks, S. CHINA
MORNING POST (Hong Kong), Oct. 17, 2002, at B2. The Financial Affairs Panel is one
of the eighteen committees established by the LegCo to monitor and examine
government policies and issues of public interest. Id. The panel may invite any person
to provide information on the matters being examined and may summarize its findings as
well as make recommendations to the House Committee which may, if necessary, table it
at a council sitting. Id.
83 At the meeting, the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury insisted
that he did not know of the details of the delisting proposals nor did he need to know the
nitty-gritty details of the same. See Ambrose Leung, Ministerial System Has Been Beset
by Scandals ofAll Scales, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Hong Kong), June 30, 2003, at N4.
Nonetheless, he agreed that he bore a certain degree of responsibility, although no one
had complained about the delisting proposals being too harsh before their release. See
Jimmy Cheung, Minister Bows To the Pressure; Financial Services Chief Apologizes for
Penny Stocks Controversy But Critics Are Far from Happy, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Hong Kong), Sept. 12, 2002, at N6.
84 See At the Crossroads, supra note 81.
85 See How Events Unfolded, supra note 81.
86 See Enoch Yiu, Stock Exchange Chief Says He Will Stand Down Next April;
Kwong Ki-chi's Move Ends Speculation which Followed the Penny Stocks Fiasco, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (Hong Kong), Nov. 14, 2002, at NI. The Chief Executive
declined to initiate a statutory investigation under the "Commissions of Inquiry
Ordinance" which would have given him more extensive powers despite a vote by the
Legislative Council requesting that he do the same. Id. He instead stated that the
establishment of the Panel of Inquiry by the Financial Secretary was "very appropriate"
and pledged that there would be no cover-up in the course of the inquiry. Id.
87 Id.
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for their losses.88
It is obvious that cross-sectional support is assured for any
proposal that seeks to enhance the standards of corporate
governance of listed companies in the HKSAR."9 Unfortunately,
the above chronology of events illustrates how a good idea can be
turned into a public relations debacle as a result of poor
communication or poor implementation.9 ° The entire process
could have been viewed as a comedy of errors on the part of the
regulators if not for the fact that many investors lost money and
the reputation of the capital markets of the HKSAR suffered as a
result.
The prompt withdrawal of the delisting proposals, seemingly
under threat of a populist revolt by certain vested interests, merits
criticism. This action contradicts the widely held view that that
there is a need to improve the regulation of penny stocks, and
highlights the insensitivity of the regulators to the marketplace.
The circumstances surrounding the release of the Consultation
Paper created the impression that the objectives had been
determined and all that remained to be resolved was the manner in
which the delisting proposals were to be implemented. The inept
handling came at the expense of public interest. At the very least,
the contradictory assertions by various officials caused investors to
lose confidence in the public administration of the HKSAR,
ensuring that the new ministerial system of governance that was
introduced by the Chief Executive just weeks before on July 1,
2002, would fail.
IV. A Critique of Part C
In attempting to cover its bases, the HKEx may have done
itself an injustice by complicating what could have been an
otherwise more streamlined and comprehensible proposal to delist
shares. The Consultation Paper specified eleven quantitative and
88 See Jimmy Cheung, Finance Chiefs Role under Scrutiny, S. CHINA MORNING
POST (Hong Kong), Sept. 16, 2002, at N2.
89 See generally KOTEWALL & KwONG, supra note 4, at 24-33 (describing the
interaction of the three-tiered structure of the securities industry).
90 See id. at 99 (acknowledging in hindsight that better communication and
explanation should have been given at time of the proposal).
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qualitative criteria, any of which would have been sufficient to
commence the procedure leading to the delisting of the
securities.9 In a nutshell, an issuer would be considered as failing
to meet the requirements for continued listing if it fell within any
one of the following categories:
* incurring losses for three consecutive years with negative
equity, or incurring losses for three consecutive years with
an average market capitalization of less than HKD$50
million, or about USD$6.5 million, for thirty consecutive
trading days;92
* shareholder equity less than HKD$50 million and average
market capitalization of less than HKD$50 million for thirty
consecutive trading days;93
* average market capitalization of less than HKD$30 million
for thirty consecutive trading days regardless of its
shareholders' equity;94
" insolvency due to issuer or its principal subsidiary being
served with a winding-up order or going into receivership or
provisional liquidation;95
" adverse or total disclaimer opinion by auditors;96
* a moving average of the daily volume weighted share price
less than HKD$0.50, or about USD$0.065, for thirty
consecutive trading days;97
" the issuer takes a corporate action leading to a decrease in
total assets or operations or after-tax profits by at least
seventy-five percent over those of the immediate preceding
financial year, and remaining business is unable to meet the
initial listing eligibility criteria of the SEHK;98
* designation as a cash company, defined as one with ninety
percent of its net assets in cash, short-dated securities,
91 HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 1.
92 Id. at 77.
93 Id. at 78.
94 Id. at 79.
95 Id. at 81.
96 Id. at 82.
97 Id. at 85.
98 Id. at 90.
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portfolio shares investment, or other marketable securities;99
* suspension of shares from trading for a continuous period of
more than twelve months; 00
* breaching the Listing Rules;' or
* undertaking operations that are either illegal or contrary to
the general principles of the SEHK. °2
With two exceptions, the foregoing proposals were to take
effect immediately upon the passing of the requisite amendments
to the Listing Rules. 103 The HKEx proposed a twelve month
transition period for compliance with the rules where issuers had
breached either the financial standards or minimum share price
criteria. 104 The transition period was premised on the need to
protect the issuers and their minority shareholders against the
potentially harsh effects of the these proposals.0 5
There are at least three critiques of the proposed delisting of
penny stocks: the arbitrary nature of the proposed minimum price,
the inconsistencies between various parts of the proposals, and the
failure to establish a ready market for delisted stocks. Each of
these is addressed in the following paragraphs.
A. Arbitrary Nature of Proposed Minimum Price
Despite its importance, the HKEx did not provide any rationale
as to why the figure of HKD$0.50 was selected as the proposed
minimum share price. 10 6  Nevertheless, it did disclose the
following detailed chronology of its discussions with the SFC
99 Id. at 93. This definition does not extend to investment companies, banks,
insurance, or other similar financial services companies which are "qualified lenders."
See SECURITIES & FUTURES ORDINANCE, supra note 18, § 308(1).
100 HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 1, at 95.
1o Id.
102 Id. at 98.
103 Id. at 99-100.
104 Id. at 99. The procedure for the delisting of securities is set out in Part E of the
Consultation Paper, entitled "Cancellation of Listing Procedures." Id. These are
relatively non-contentious, with a primary emphasis on the need for fairness and
transparency within an effective mechanism. Id.
105 Id. at 99.
106 Id. at 85.
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regarding the matter." 7
July 30, 2001
August 8, 2001
December 12, 2001
December 24, 2001
April 30, 2002
The HKEx submits a preliminary draft
proposal to the SFC seeking to require the
consolidation of stocks that trade at
HKD$0.01, or USD$0.0013, for more than
twenty trading days within a three month
period.0 8  It further proposes that the
minimum consolidated price be no less than
HKD$0.10, or USD$0.013, and that issuers
be barred from undertaking any corporate
transaction that would result in their
theoretical value falling below this
threshold.'0 9
The SFC responds by stating that the
criterion should either be HKD$1 or
HKD$5, USD$0.13 or USD$0.65,
respectively. "0
The HKEx revises its proposals to mandate
that issuers seek consolidation of stocks
when their shares trade at below
HKD$0.20, or USD$0.026, for the period in
question. 1 '
The SFC insists that the threshold be set at
no less than HKD$1."'
The HKEx further revises its proposal by
increasing the threshold to HKD$0.30, or
USD$0.039, and for a minimum initial
public offering (IPO) price of HKD$1 for
all new issues that follow the amendment of
107 Press Release, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, Transcript of
Remarks by Kwong Ki-chi, Chief Executive of Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing
Limited at the Financial Affairs Panel of the Legislative Council (Aug. 31, 2002),
available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/0207313news.htm.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
I"I Id.
112 Id.
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May 5, 2002
May 15, 2002
June 8, 2002
June 17, 2002
July 10, 2002
the Listing Rules." 3
The SFC reiterates its position that the
minimum price threshold should be set at
HKD$1, while the minimum IPO price
should be HKD$5. 1 4
The HKEx responds by stating that the
proposed HKD$1 minimum price threshold
is "too hasty" and agrees to discuss a range
between HKD$0.30 and HKD$0.50 as an
interim measure.' 15
The HKEx submits its second draft
proposal, which includes revised thresholds
set at HKD$0.50 as the minimum share
price at which consolidation would be
required and HKD$2 as the minimum price
of lPOs.1t 6
The SFC replies that it has "no definite
views" on the proposed revised
thresholds. 7
The HKEx sends the fifth draft of its
Consultation Paper to the Listing
Committee of the SEHK1 8 for comments
and approval after the SFC replies that it
has no strong opinion on the same.'1 9
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See LISTING RULES, supra note 30, at ch. 2. While the Listing Division of the
SEHK, a wholly owned subsidiary of the HKEx, processes applications for listing on
both the Main Board and the Growth Enterprise Market, the listings are subject to the
approval of the relevant Listing Committee of the board to which the applicant seeks the
listing. See id. All of the powers and functions regarding all listing matters are
discharged by the Listing Committee and/or its delegates under the authority of the board
of the SEHK. Id. The composition of the Listing Committee of the Main Board is
specified under Rule 2A.17 of the Listing Rules, which states that a maximum of four of
its twenty-five members can be engaged in fund management. Id.
119 Press Release, HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 107.
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Thus, the proposals on the appropriate definition of a penny
stock, as measured in terms of its value, ranged from a low of
HKD$0.10, as suggested by the HKEx, to a high of HKD$5, as
suggested by the SFC."' In the absence of any stated reason, and
in view of the series of exchanges between the HKEx and the
SFC, it is not unreasonable to assume that the proposed minimum
share price threshold was made rather arbitrarily. Under the
circumstances, it is perhaps somewhat of an anomaly that no
specific reference was made to the par value of the shares.'21 This
is significant because, as illustrated by Table 1 below, there are
thirty-eight different par values ranging from a low of HKD$0.001
to a high of HKD$5. In fact, so lax is the extent of the monitoring
that seven companies122 have par values of less than HKD$0.01
which, as of June 30, 2002, is the lowest market price for which
trades may be executed.
23
120 Id.
121 The par value is otherwise known as the nominal value of the shares. See
COMPANIES ORDINANCE, ch. 32, § 5(4)(a) (1997), at http://www.justice.gov.hk/
home.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (requires companies to state the amount of share
capital that they propose to be registered and their division into shares of a fixed
amount).
122 The seven companies: are Gold Wo International Holdings Limited (SEHK
Stock Code 0090), Cheuk Nang (Holdings) Limited (0131), Star East Holdings Limited
(0198), Asia Orient Holdings Limited (0214), New City (Beijing) Development Limited
(0456), The Sun's Group Limited (0988), and Fulbond Holdings Limited (1041). [The
author acknowledges with gratitude the kind assistance of the respective compainies in
providing the information.]
123 See LISTING AGREEMENT, at para. 30 (providing that "where the market price of
the securities of the Issuer approaches the extremities of HKD$0.01 or HKD$9,995.00,
the Exchange reserves the right to require the Issuer ... to proceed with a consolidation
or splitting of its securities"). Id. Trades are conducted electronically with varying
askibid spreads depending on the price at which the shares are traded. See Low, supra
note 13, at 69-89. All clearing and settlement is effected through the Central Clearing
and Settlement System (CCASS) and the CCASS Depository, a computerized book-
entry system that is based on the immobilization of shares in a central depository
operated by Hongkong Clearing, a subsidiary of the HKEx. Id. Hongkong Clearing
performs securities clearing and settlement, electronic money settlement, depository,
common nominee and share registration services for eligible securities that are listed on
the SEHK. Id.
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Table 1: Par Values of Shares Listed on the Stock Exchange of
Hong Kong
12 4
Par Value HKD USD RMB AUD
0.001 4 1 0 0
0.005 2 1 0 0
0.01 111 9 0 0
0.0125 1 0 0 0
0.02 19 2 0 0
0.025 9 1 0 0
0.05 22 2 0 0
0.08 2 0 0 0
0.1 372 6 2 0
0.12 1 0 0 0
0.125 1 0 0 0
0.18 1 0 0 0
0.2 28 0 0 1
0.25 20 1 0 0
0.3 1 0 0 0
0.4 5 0 0 0
0.5 36 2 0 0
0.6 1 0 0 0
0.65 1 0 0 0
0.7 1 0 0 0
0.75 1 0 0 0
1.00 57 0 50 0
2.00 4 0 0 0
124 Data compiled from publicly available information obtained from the websites of
the HKEx as of June 30, 2002, the end of the month immediately preceding the release
of the Consultation Paper, HONG KONG EXCHANGES & SECURITIES LTD., at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/invest/isc.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004), or hand collected
directly from the companies concerned. In the opinion of the author, the HKEx should
have considered the relevance of par value in the context of company law in Hong Kong
and taken note of the same in determining an appropriate value for the definition of
penny stock. This would have minimized the arbitrariness which appeared to have been
involved during the lengthy discussions between the HKEx and the SFC on the subject
of classifying penny stocks.
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2.50 2 0 0 0
4.00 1 0 0 0
5.00 7 0 0 0
The Companies Ordinance does not require that the capital of
companies be denominated in Hong Kong Dollars 125 nor does it
dictate how that capital should be divided. 126  Companies are
accorded some degree of flexibility because shares may be issued
for cash or for non-cash consideration. 12' But, as a general
principle, the courts have sought to ensure that a company has
received the capital that is reflected as paid in its books and that it
is not improperly returned to its shareholders.1
28
As evident from Table 1 above, there were four different
currencies used to specify the par values of shares that were listed
on the Main Board as of June 30, 2002. They are the Hong Kong
Dollar (710 companies), the Chinese Renminbi (52 companies),
the U.S. Dollar (25 companies), and the Australian Dollar (one
company). 129 Almost one-half of all companies listed on the Main
Board had a par value of, or equivalent to, HK$0.10. A mere 170
companies, or less than 22% of the total number of listed
companies at the material time, had par values at or above the
proposed delisting threshold of HK$0.50.
The reference to par value is significant because, at common
law, companies may not validly issue their shares at a discount
even if it is in their interest to do so. 30 Furthermore, a company
could not give itself the capacity to issue shares at a discount by
125 See Re Scandinavian Bank Group plc [1988] Ch 87, [1987] 2 W.L.R 752 (Eng.).
126 See COMPANIES ORDINANCE, supra note 121.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., RULES GOVERNING THE LISTING OF
SECURITIES ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG LTD., CH. 19 (2004), at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/rule/listrules/Chapter/2019%20(0331).doc (stating that dual
listings are permitted and companies incorporated in jurisdictions other than those
specified above may apply for a secondary listing on the SEHK on a case-by-case basis);
HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., BASIC LISTING REQUIREMENTS FOR EQUITIES,
at http://www.hkex.com.hk/issuer/listhk/equities.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (the
SEHK allows companies that are incorporated in the HKSAR, Bermuda, the Cayman
Islands, and the People's Republic of China to seek a primary listing on the exchange).
130 See Ooregum Gold Mining Co. of India Ltd. v. Roper, [1892] A.C. 125. (Eng.).
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including such a provision in its objects clause.'31 Nevertheless,
the common law has been statutorily amended in two ways. First,
if it fulfills certain stringent conditions, a company may issue
shares at a discount, but this is restricted to those of a class that it
has already issued.3 2  Second, a company is permitted to pay a
commission, not exceeding ten percent, in consideration of a
person subscribing for shares.'33
When the HKEx reviewed the options for the delisting of
penny stocks it should have taken into consideration the emphasis
the law places upon the importance of par values, as evidenced by
its imposition of strict guidelines to prevent the issuance of shares
at a discount.'34 Taking into consideration these guidelines and the
need to provide for an equitable solution to the delisting of penny
stocks, a correlation should have been drawn between the par
value of the shares of a company and the proposed minimum
price. In short, shares should only be considered as potential
delisting candidates when they trade at prices below their par
values over a specified period of time. At the very least, this will
avoid the arbitrary nature through which the HKEx appears to
have arrived at its proposed threshold. It also provides an
objective benchmark against which share price performance can
be evaluated and, perhaps most importantly, its adoption will
131 Per judgment of Lord Halsbury LC; wherein his Lordship referred to precedent
from Ashbury Co. v. Riche [1875] L.R. 7 (Eng.). See COMPANIES ORDINANCE, supra
note 121, §§ 5A-C (stating that companies that are incorporated in the HKSAR are no
longer required to state their objects in their memorandum of association); Pearl Island
Hotel Ltd. v. Li Ka-yu [1988] 2 HKLR 87 (P.R.C.); European Asian Bank v. Reicar Inv.
Ltd. [1988] 1 HKLR 45 (P.R.C.); Stable Inv. Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Chang Shin-cheun
[1982] HKLR 79 (P.R.C.); So Kwan Nane v. Kowloon Stock Exch. Ltd. [1973-76] 1
HKC 315 (P.R.C.) (stating that the provision has no retrospective effect and companies
that retain their objects clauses remain subject to the application of the doctrine of ultra
vires in the HKSAR).
132 COMPANIES ORDINANCE, supra note 121, § 50. The conditions include an
authorization by the members at general meeting which is sanctioned by the court. Id.
The shares must thereafter be issued within a month of the sanction by the court or
within such period as specified by order of the court. Id.
133 Id. § 46. This requires authorization in the articles of association and disclosure
of the details to the members. Id. If the maximum ten percent commission is granted,
the subscriber would only need to pay HKD$0.90 as full consideration for the issue of a
share with a par value of HKD$1. See PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF
MODERN COMPANY LAW 306 (6th ed. 1997) (describing application of this section).
134 See COMPANIES ORDINANCE, supra note 121, at § 50.
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allow for enhanced transparency in the market place.
To balance the dual objectives of minimizing potential
disruption to the market on the one hand and the need to enhance
the regulation of penny stocks on the other, the HKEx should have
initially compelled all companies listed on the SEHK to have a par
value of no less than HKD$0.10 or its equivalent. This would
have affected 181 companies or about 23% of all those listed on
the Main Board when the Consultation Paper was released on July
25, 2002. In addition, the HKEx should have made clear that
these companies would neither be delisted automatically nor
immediately because all that was required at that time was a
promise to undertake the necessary capital restructuring to
consolidate their shares, otherwise known as a reverse stock-split.
Yet, this threshold must be viewed as merely a means to an
end if the objective is to enhance corporate governance in the
HKSAR. Given the prominence that the law presently places on
the par value of shares and companies, unequivocal benchmarks
and time frames should be established for the implementation of a
system that would minimize the incidence of different par values.
For example, the HKEx could set HKD$1.00 or its equivalent as
its ultimate target for the minimum par value of shares that are
listed on the SEHK by December 31, 2006. By doing so, the
HKEx would avoid the uncertainties and confusion that beset the
market when it released its Consultation Paper on July 25, 2002.
Such a move would be viewed as a positive contribution by the
HKEx towards realizing the stated objective of establishing Hong
Kong as a paragon of corporate governance within the region.135
B. Inconsistency of Proposals
The collapse in the prices of penny stocks on July 26, 2002,
may be based, at least in part, on the apparent ambiguities and
inconsistencies of the Consultation Paper.136 Although much of
the focus was directed at the proposed delisting of penny stocks,
the Consultation Paper had a wider reference in seeking to address
issues that arose from the following areas:
135 See Donald Tsang, The 2001-2002 Budget Speech, at http://www.info.gov.hk/
fstb/tb/budget/budgetO 1 -02/english/efile.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
136 See generally HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 1.
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* initial listing eligibility criteria;' 37
" continuing obligations of listed companies;138 and,
* disclosure requirements at the time of initial listing. 139
Collectively, the different sections of the Consultation Paper
were designed to enhance the perceived "quality" of the listed
companies by assessing their financial performance as well as
investor acceptance and by benchmarking these against those of
their counterparts within particular industries. 4 ° Unfortunately,
whether by design or accident, various parts of the Consultation
Paper appear to conflict with each other,'4 ' further compounding
the uncertainties financial markets loathe. This section of the
article highlights two principal anomalies that must be rectified to
avoid the possibility of a repeat of the penny stock debacle.
1. Conflict of Interests
The proposed Initial Listing Eligibility Criteria set out in Part
B 42 conflicts with the proposed delisting criteria of the
Consultation Paper. 4 3 The former proposes amending the "Listing
Rules" to specify a minimum issue price of HKD$2, or about
USD$0.26, with a minimum market capitalization of HKD$200
million, or approximately USD$26 million.' The existing rules
do not specify any minimum initial offering price, which is left
entirely to the discretion of the company and its advisers and
underwriters.'45 However, the rules as they applied did specify
that the minimum market capitalization at the time of listing
should be HKD$100 million, or half of what is proposed in the
137 Id. at 33-72.
138 Id. at 101-13.
139 Id. at 123-30.
140 ld. at 1-25.
141 See infra p.104. The section titled "Adoption of Contradictory Ratios" is a
further elaboration of the inconsistencies in the Consultation Paper.
142 See Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited, supra note 1, at 33-72.
143 Id. at 73-100.
144 Compare HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 1, 59 & 92
with 144. The rationale provided for these proposals is founded on the need to
minimize the market manipulation which is deemed more prevalent with companies with
lower market capitalization and shares that trade at relatively lower price levels.
145 See LISTING RULES, supra note 30.
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Consultation Paper. 146
While the HKEx professes not to subscribe to the view that
there is any relationship between the market capitalization and the
quality of the issuer, it nonetheless stated that an increase in the
former will ensure "only companies of a reasonable size could be
listed on the Exchange."' 147 Regarding the proposal for setting the
minimum initial public offering price of HKD$2, the HKEx
expressed the opinion that "the predominance of low priced
securities, so-called penny stocks, on the Exchange may have an
adverse effect on the perception of the quality of the Hong Kong
market" and is, therefore, "not compatible with the goodwill that
Hong Kong has been building up as an international financial
centre.",48
Noble as such reasons are, the author rejects the "bigger is
better" principle upon which the HKEx appears to have premised
the rationale for its proposals. The presumption that larger
capitalized companies and/or those with a higher share price are
less likely to suffer financial difficulties has been effectively
disproved by recent corporate bankruptcies in the United States.
49
The HKEx proposals have two principal problems. First, the
proposals do not address possible remedies if the market
capitalization falls below the required HKD$200 million after the
listing of the company because the emphasis is on raising the
threshold rather than on the subsequent maintenance of the same.
Second, although the minimum initial public offering price is set
at HKD$2, the selection of this number seems rather arbitrary
because no rationale is provided.
146 See id. 8.08, 8.09(1), 8.09(2) (specifying the maintenance of the minimum
public float and the mechanism for the same respectively). An amendment that took
effect Mar. 31, 2004 revised this number to HKD$200 million. Id. 8.05(2).
147 HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 1, at 48.
148 Id. at 62.
149 See, e.g., Ethan G. Zelizer, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Accounting for Corporate
Corruption?, 15 LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 27 (2002) (discussing several recent corporate
bankruptcies in the U.S.). At its peak in the year 2000, Enron was the seventh largest
capitalized company in the United States, yet it collapsed spectacularly within a period
of a few months. Id. Another recent example is WorldCom the shares of which traded
in excess of USD$60 during the height of the intemet bubble, and yet within two years it
attained the dubious distinction for being the largest corporate bankruptcy in the United
States. Id.
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As the imposition of a higher initial market capitalization
and/or a higher initial public offering price would not, by itself,
raise the level of protection accorded to investors, it is possible
that the reason may have more to do with the financial
performance of the HKEx than has been disclosed. The principal
sources of income for the HKEx are the initial and annual listing
fees as well as the trading levy of 0.01% that it receives on each
transaction. 5 ° The proposals as described would enhance the
profitability of the HKEx in two ways: by increasing its income
through the trading fee based on the velocity of turnover of
shares"' and by reducing the cost of its regulatory functions as set
out in the Listing Rules. The latter is not insignificant especially
with respect to penny stocks which often cost disproportionately
more to regulate than their larger capitalized counterparts. 52 The
150 The buyer and seller to the transaction share this levy equally, at a rate of
0.005% each. See SECURITIES & FUTURES ORDINANCE, supra note 18. The HKEx also
receives a settlement fee of 0.002% subject to a minimum of HKD$2 and a maximum of
HKD$100 for transactions through its subsidiary that operates the Central Clearing and
Settlement System (CCASS). Id. As such, the HKEx derives an income of at least
0.014% for each transaction that is executed on the SEHK, the latter of which is a legal
monopoly under § 19 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance. Id. § 19.
151 The velocity of turnover is the percentage at which the stock of a company
changes hands over any given period and may be computed by dividing the annual
turnover of a particular stock with its market capitalization. See Quality of Market and
the Case for More Effective Delisting Mechanism, CORPORATE FINANCE Div. &
RESEARCH DEPT. OF THE HONG KONG SECURITIES & FUTURES COMM'N, (July 2002) at
http://www.hksfc.org.hk/eng/press-releases/html/index/index2.html. As of December
31, 2001, the HKEx had a velocity of turnover of 50%, which is dwarfed by those of
NASDAQ (382%) and the stock markets of Korea (196%) and Taiwan (186%). Id. The
dealing in shares of larger capitalized companies and/or higher prices generates more
revenue for the HKEx than penny stocks, since the computation of the trading levy and
the settlement fee is based on the price at which the trade was executed. Id. The direct
financial interest of the HKEx is illustrated by the fact that it is not uncommon for the
top 100 companies on the SEHK to account for about 90% of its total market
capitalization on any given trading day. Id.
152 This is due to two principal reasons. First, transactions undertaken by penny
stock companies are generally large in relation to their size. See, e.g., Webb, The
Delisting Fiasco, supra note 65; Webb, PIPSI Submission, supra note 65. Second, a
number of these companies get into financial difficulty and need to restructure. See, e.g.,
Webb, The Delisting Fiasco, supra note 65; Webb, PIPSI Submission, supra note 65.
Both of these require adherence to procedure and the preparation of voluminous
documentation that are costly in terms of monitoring and regulating for the HKEx. See,
e.g., Webb, The Delisting Fiasco, supra note 65; Webb, PIPSI Submission, supra note
65.
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foregoing clearly exposes the conflict of interest faced by the
HKEx in its dual role as a for-profit company and front-line
regulator.
2. Adoption of Contradictory Ratios
While Part B of the Consultation Paper advocates setting the
minimum initial public offering price at HKD$2 and increasing
the initial minimum market capitalization to HKD$200 million,
the ratios adopted for these contradict with those proposed for the
delisting of shares as outlined in Part C.1 3 If the foregoing ratio of
100,000,000 to 1 minimum market capitalization to minimum
share price5 4 was to be consistently applied for the purpose of
delisting penny stocks, then the threshold ought to have been set at
HKD$0.30 or approximately USD$0.039. This is because the
HKEx proposed the delisting of shares which had an average
market capitalization of less than HKD$30 million for thirty
consecutive trading days regardless of its shareholders equity.'
Be that as it may, this threshold of HKD$0.30 will still be subject
to the same contention that it is arbitrarily derived because its
computation is premised upon the proposed minimum initial
public offering price of HKD$2.15 6
A closer examination of the proposed ratios further exposes
anomalies which could possibly lead to the delisting of relatively
financially stronger companies, while relatively weaker entities
remain.5 7 For example, under the proposals it would be possible
for a company with a market capitalization of more than HKD$50
million to be delisted if its share price drops below the minimum
price threshold of HKD$0.50, while its counterpart with a market
153 Compare HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 1, 59 & 92
with id. 144.
154 See HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 1, at 47-50, 61-62
(July 2002). The ratio of 100,000,000 to 1 is derived by dividing the specified minimum
market capitalization (HKDS200 million) by the minimum initial public offering price
(HKD$2).
155 Id. at 79. If the minimum market capitalization is set as HKD$30 million, then
the applicable minimum share price ought to be HKD$0.30, if the ratio of 100,000,000 to
1 is adopted and applied consistently.
156 Compare HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., supra note 1, 131 with
144.
157 Id.
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capitalization of just HKD$30 million would remain its price
remained above the requisite level.158 This appears somewhat
illogical, but it is nonetheless a foreseeable consequence of the
proposals set out in the Consultation Paper. Although the size of a
company as measured by its market capitalization is easily
quantifiable, its significance and importance may be less relevant
than the performance of the company.'59 Companies may grow
organically and/or by acquisitions, and it should be a function of
the SEHK to facilitate rather than to impede this growth, the latter
of which is a foreseeable consequence if seemingly arbitrary and
contradictory thresholds are applied.
C. The Absence of a Ready Market for Delisted Penny Stocks
The price of any security is a function of demand and supply.
Investors determine the overall demand principally on their
assessment of the relative risks and returns associated with the
security and how these fit within their individual investment
profile. Central to this price discovery mechanism is the
availability of a market that facilitates the meeting of buyers and
sellers. Stock markets fulfill this function, providing the requisite
framework to instill confidence.
As the front-line regulator of the stock market and the
activities of the listed companies, the HKEx has a duty to ensure
its facilities provide for an orderly and fair market in securities
trading. The interests of the investing public must be paramount
given their position as a vital cog in the overall machinery of
efficient financial markets. To achieve these objectives, the HKEx
may establish and implement rules that pertain to transactions
effected on or through its facilities. The SFC supervises the HKEx
by requiring the latter to seek its approval before any new rule or
regulation is issued.16 ° In short, the HKEx not only provides the
facilities investors need to trade securities, it also ensures a certain
degree of protection for investors by imposing a set of continuing
obligations on issuers.161 Just as the admission to listing on the
SEHK assures the issuers and their investors access to such
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See SECURITIES & FUTURES ORDINANCE, supra note 18, at § 24.
161 See LISTING RULES, supra note 30, chs. 13, 14, & 14A.
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facilities, the proposed delisting of penny stocks will deprive them
of the same.
In view of the gravity of the consequences, especially
regarding the protection of minority shareholders, it would be
convenient to mandate the continued listing of shares until such
companies faced liquidation162 or are privatized. In both instances,
investors would have no further need for the market since their
shares would either be worthless or acquired. Although it should
not be a function of the HKEx to provide an absolute guarantee
that its facilities will be open to all companies that are listed on the
Main Board regardless of whether they are in breach of the
applicable rules and/or fail to meet the continuing obligations
imposed, the responsibility of the HKEx is such that it should not
be involved in depriving investors of a market for the shares that
are delisted. The duty to ensure the provision of facilities for an
orderly and fair market in the trading of securities would require
the HKEx to establish an alternative market for the trading of the
delisted shares, at least on an "over-the-counter" or "OTC" basis.
This market could be the "OTC Board" of the SEHK with the
other two being the Main Board and the Growth Enterprise
Market, or GEM.'63 Both the ask-bid spreads and the transactions
costs are likely to be higher in the OTC Board compared with
those on either the Main Board or on GEM, but such would be the
natural consequence of a less efficient market. In any event, an
inefficient market is still better than not having any ready market
at all.
V. An Alternative Framework
This author does not question the need for an effective
delisting mechanism on the grounds that it leads to an
enhancement of the standards of corporate governance and
162 This process is known as corporate bankruptcy in the United States. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (1993).
163 The HKEx is the ideal candidate under the existing regulatory regime to assume
oversight of the proposed OTC Board because it would provide investors with the same
degree of protection under the Listing Rules. See LISTING RULES, supra note 30. A
different scale of charges for listing and transactions may need to be imposed given the
higher risks and volatility of the market, but such mechanics would be relatively easy to
resolve by establishing the OTC Board. This is an important condition precedent before
the HKEx can implement the proposals for the delisting of shares.
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unequivocally supports the rationale which has been advanced by
the Chairman of the SFC. 164 That rationale can be summarized as
follows:
" The threat of delisting provides incentive to management
and controlling shareholders to improve corporate
governance and company performance.
165
" With no exit, some controlling shareholders have no
incentive to turn companies around from making losses year
after year. 16
6
* Stocks tend to have higher volatility and are more easily
manipulated when they have low unit prices and very thin
trading. 167
* The low unit prices could mislead investors into thinking
that the stocks are cheap when in reality those unit prices do
not reflect a company's fundamentals. 68
" The continued listing of poorly performing companies
affects the overall reputation of Hong Kong SAR as an
international financial center.
69
A. Criteria for Delisting
In order for any proposed delisting mechanism to work
effectively, it must be simple, equitable, and clear. Its framework
must provide sufficient safeguards to ensure the protection of
minority shareholders' interests and eliminate penalties against
shareholders for or by the actions of the company and/or its
directors over whom they may not have any control. In addition,
there should also be some benchmarking against the initial listing
criteria imposed by the HKEx to ensure consistency. The
following paragraphs take into consideration these requirements
and propose an alternative framework for the delisting of penny
stocks. In a nutshell, the author proposes that the Listing Rules be
164 See Press Release, Securities and Futures Commission, Chairman's Statement on
HKEx's Delisting Consultation (July 2002), available at http:www.hksfc.org.hk/eng/
pressjreleases/html/press-release/02/02prl 58.htm.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
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amended so that stocks which fail to implement the necessary
remedial action to the satisfaction of the HKEx are earmarked for
possible delisting only if they meet any two of the following
criteria:
" The shares trade at or below the minimum prescribed par
value of HKD$0.10 for ten or more trading days within a
three-month period.170
* The market capitalization of the shares is less than
HKD$200 million for any period of ten trading days within
a three month period.17'
* The company is suspended from trading for a continuous
period of more than six months.
" The company accounts are disclaimed or subject to adverse
opinion by its auditors. 17 2
Using the first three criteria listed above, only eighty-four
stocks, or about 9.7% of the total number of companies listed on
the Main Board, would have been identified as potential delisting
candidates as of June 30, 2004.171
170 See supra text accompanying notes 106-135 for a discussion of the rationale. As
almost half of the companies on the Main Board have a par value of HKD$0.10, it is
proposed that the HKEx set the minimum par value at this level to minimize disruptions
to the market. Under the circumstances this will also be the defacto minimum price at
which delisting will be considered. However, the HKEx should also set out a clear
timetable within which it will seek to increase the par value to such level as it deems
necessary for the effective governance of companies that are listed on the SEHK.
171 The rationale for this threshold is to ensure consistency between the existing
minimum requirement for applicants seeking a listing on the SEHK and the continuing
requirements thereof. In short, it should be made an integral aspect of the Listing Rules
for companies to always maintain the minimum market capitalization as the time of
listing as a prerequisite for their continued listing on the SEHK.
172 An "adverse audit opinion" would include any qualified opinion expressed by
the auditors as well as when the company incurs three years of losses and/or has negative
shareholder equity. Companies that are subject to the latter two circumstances may be on
the verge of insolvency or may be in need of debt restructuring to improve their financial
position. To better protect the interests of investors, auditors should be required to
highlight these in their report. In addition, auditors should be required to express an
opinion as to whether the company meets with the initial public offering requirements as
set out in the Listing Rules. See generally LISTING RULES, supra note 30.
173 A list of these companies, excluding those for which accounts have been
qualified, is set out infra Appendix I. The data was compiled from (i) the websites of the
HKEx and the individual companies, for the par value of the shares, and (ii) Datastream,
for the prices and market capitalization of the companies. The companies would need to
be in breach of any two of the three requirements; namely, trading below the prescribed
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B. Procedure for Delisting
Given the potential gravity of the consequences, the rules of
natural justice must be applied to any proposed delisting
procedure. Companies should have the right to respond to, and be
provided with, adequate opportunity to rectify their alleged breach
of the delisting criteria. To this end, a clear procedure and
framework must be set out in the revised Listing Rules. Table 2
below provides a possible range of remedial actions to be
undertaken depending on the nature of the breach by the
companies.
Table 2: Nature of Remedial Actions to be Undertaken by
Company
minimum par value of HKD$0. 10, having a market capitalization of less than HKD$200
million, and/or being suspended from trading on the SEHK for a period exceeding six
months. But this list does not include eleven companies whose shares have been
suspended from trading for more than six months including China Investment Holding
(132), Datronix Holdings (889), Global Trend (691), Gold Face Holdings (396), New
City (456), Shanghai Merchant Holdings (1104), Shanghai Land (67), Sun Man Tai
(433), Surge Recreation (703), The Sun's Group (988), and Yue Fung International
(965). These companies are presently facing a number of specific problems including
liquidation, receivership, restructuring, and finalization of accounts. Prolonged
Suspension Status Report, Main Board (Aug. 11, 2004), available at
www.hkex.com.hk/listing/psuspenrpt/psuspenrep_mb.doc. The author acknowledges
with gratitude the assistance provided by Mr. Lam Chun Kwong, Assistant Librarian of
the Chinese University of Hong Kong Library Reference Department in compiling the
data for Appendix I.
Nature of breach of Remedial action(s) required
delisting criteria
Maintain a market price above the minimum
Trading at below level for at least ten consecutive trading days.
minimum price for ten Demonstrate that steps (such as share
or more trading days consolidation or reverse stock splits and revenue
within a three month generation initiatives) are being taken to
period, enhance the value of the shares, in which case
the HKEx may consider granting a grace period
to facilitate compliance.
Maintain a market capitalization above the
Market capitalization of minimum level for at least ten consecutive
less than HKD$200 trading days.
million for ten or more Demonstrate that steps (such as asset and/or
trading days within a capital injection and revenue enhancement) are
three month period. being taken to meet the target, in which case the
HKEx may consider granting a grace period to
facilitate compliance.
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As the complexity of the proposed remedial actions may differ
between companies, the author proposes that the HKEx be granted
the flexibility to extend the initial three month period on the
application of companies that demonstrate progress in the
implementation of their proposals. To enhance accountability and
transparency, the HKEx should provide written reasons for any
case in which it does not grant the extension sought by the
companies. These companies should then be allowed to appeal to
the SFC within a specified period of time, and the decision of the
SFC will be conclusive.'74 Table 3 below sets out a proposed
timeframe for the delisting of shares from the Main Board and
their subsequent transfer and listing on the OTC Board operated
by the HKEx.'75
Table 3: Proposed Time Table for the Delisting of Shares
Timeframe Action to be taken
Formal written notification with clear
Date of notification ("T") grounds specified by HKEx to company
174 Since the decision of the SFC will be based upon the exercise of its powers
under the Securities and Futures Ordinance, it may be subject to administrative review
by the Ombudsman and/or judicial review by the courts where illegality, irrationality
and/or procedural impropriety is alleged. As such, it is perhaps more accurate to say that
the decision by the SFC is not strictly legally definitive. See, e.g., Cheng Kai-man
William v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers & Anor [9941 1 HKC 413 (P.R.C.); Ainsely
Fin. Corp. v. Ontario Sec. Comm'n [1994] 21 OR (3d) 104 (Ont.); Williams v. Keelty
[2001] 19 ACLC 1535 (Vict.). See also SuP. CT. R. Order 53.
175 See supra note 163.
Lift the suspension and ensure trading is not
suspended again for any period often
Suspension for a period consecutive trading days within the next six
exceeding six months. months.
Propose corporate restructuring be required to
facilitate the early lifting of suspension, in
which case the HKEx may consider the granting
of a grace period to facilitate compliance.
Where possible, work with the relevant parties
Accounts disclaimed or to rectify the problems identified.
subject to an Adverse Consider the continued viability of the company
Opinion. and decide on any actions appropriate under the
circumstances, including capital injection,
corporate restructuring, scheme of arrangement,
or liquidation.
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Company to rectify or appeal against
T + three months alleged breach of delisting criteria as
stated by HKEx
Between T + four months and Extension of grace period for compliance
T + nine months by HKEx
T + ten months Commence procedure for the transfer ofI the shares for listing on the OTC Board
T + twelve months Trading of shares on the OTC Board toI_ _ commence
To ensure adequate investor protection, the market must be
fully informed about the identification of a company as a potential
delisting candidate for its breach of the criteria. This may be
reasonably easy to achieve by simply placing the prefix "X"
before the stock code of the share involved, which should then be
prominently displayed through the trading screen system of the
HKEx. The "X" indicates the particular stock may be subject to
increased volatility and risks because it is subject to possible
delisting from the SEHK should it fail to undertake the necessary
remedial action. A color-coded identification system may be
required to enable investors to distinguish between those shares at
various stages of the timeline leading towards their eventual
delisting. 176
C. Privatization
It is reasonable to assume that rational shareholders will start
to sell down their potential penny stock holdings if they fear that
the shares may be delisted. The potential for the delisting of
shares may be a self-fulfilling prophesy as rational investment
decisions are likely to cause a collapse in the price of such
securities when they approach the status of being classified as
penny stocks. In view of the depressed price of the shares, a
highly probable consequence is an opportunity for the undertaking
of "privatization on the cheap" is minimized by controlling
176 Alternatively, a different set of alphabets could be adopted to indicate the degree
of risk. For example, "X" could be the first level, followed by "Y" and "Z" as the next
levels of risk, with "Z" being the most serious, indicating that delisting is imminent.
Such a measure has already been adopted for companies that are listed on GEM, which
uses stock codes beginning with the number eight to distinguish them from their Main
Board counterparts. See Information on Listed Companies, GROWTH ENTERPRISE
MARKET (giving a full listing of companies that are listed on GEM), at
http://www.hkgem.com/company/e-default.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
2004)
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shareholders of the company at the expense of the minority
shareholders. This scenario is particularly relevant in the HKSAR
given the strong dominance of families and the state in the
ownership of companies, which collectively control some ninety-
four percent of all the companies that are listed on the Main
Board. 177
To ensure that opportunities for "privatization on the cheap"
three further proposals should be considered. First, the controlling
shareholders should be compelled to make a general offer for all
the shares at a price no less than the weighted average for the six
months preceding the formal notification of delisting by the
HKEx. 178  Although share prices are likely to fall in the period
immediately preceding the threat of delisting, they may trade
closer to their true values in the absence of the same. The
imposition of such a rule would act as a deterrent to controlling
shareholders who may otherwise exploit opportunities to force a
delisting. Second, pecuniary penalties should be imposed on those
who are found to have abused the system for personal financial
gains. 179 Finally, the controlling shareholders and directors of
177 See Larry Lang et al., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS CO-RELATING THE PERFORMANCE OF
PUBLIC LISTED COMPANIES WITH THEIR SHAREHOLDERS' PROFILE, available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/cr/download/scclr/economicse.pdf. Although significant, the
dominance of the family and the state is not limited to companies in the HKSAR. See
also S. Classens et al., Separation of Ownership from Control of East Asian Firms, 58(1)
J. OF FIN. Eco. 81 (2000) (examining the separation of ownership and control for 2,980
corporations in nine East Asian countries); R. La Portaet al., Corporate Ownership
Around the World, 54(2) J. OF FIN. 471 (1999) (presenting data on ownership structures
of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies, making an effort to identify ultimate
controlling shareholders of these firms).
178 This will apply only where the company is privatized and/or is privatized within
a year of the transfer of its listing to the proposed OTC Board. Due care should be taken
in the formulation of this proposal as an in-depth analysis would have to be directed at a
number of important issues such as the possibility of parties acting in concert, the
manner in which the time frame is computed as regards the privatization and the need to
be fair to all parties to the transaction.
179 To be an effective deterrent, the computation of this penalty could be based on
that adopted for insider dealing which is up to three times the profits made. Provisions
would have to be made for the SFC to take action against the relevant parties and to
thereafter reimburse investors for any losses that arise directly from the privatization. To
ensure an equitable outcome for all parties, it is further proposed that the quantum of
compensation will be the net of proven losses less the share of the costs of the action by
the SFC. All surpluses that arise out of such actions should be maintained in a separate
account to fund further actions and must not be treated as extraordinary income for the
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companies that are so privatized should be disqualified from
accessing the facilities of the HKEx for a prescribed period.18 °
As the foregoing necessitates the pronouncement of a new set
of rules as well as a change in the mindsets of regulators and the
government, a detailed analysis remains outside of the scope of
this article. Nonetheless, it raises a number of significant policy
initiatives that warrant further detailed exploration as they bode
well for the aspirations of the government of the HKSAR to
establish the territory as a paragon of corporate governance.
VI. Conclusion
Much has transpired since the penny stock debacle of July
2002. Following the publication of the report by the Panel of
Inquiry on the Penny Stock Incident, the Financial Secretary
established an expert group chaired by Mr. Alan Cameron, who
served as the Chairman of the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission between 1993 and 2000, to review the
operation of the securities and futures market regulatory
structure. 181  The expert group made a number of significant
SFC. The Public Shareholders Group of the SFC could be entrusted with the formulation
of detailed guidelines with respect to the application of this surplus.
180 This proposal will be similar in its application to Part IV. A of the Companies
Ordinance which deals with the disqualification of directors of insolvent companies.
COMPANIES ORDINANCE, supra note 121. Part IV. A empowers the court to disqualify
persons from assuming the position of director when they are convicted of an indictable
offence for persistent default in relation to the provisions of the Companies Ordinance,
fraud or general unfitness. The last of the four categories requires the court to consider
the conduct of the person to determine whether he or she is unfit to be involved in the
management of companies. See e.g., COMPANIES ORDINANCE, supra note 121, § 168H;
Official Receiver v. Chung Kwan Yee et al., [1994] MP No 3605 of 1994 (unreported
decision of Mar. 31, 1995), available at http://www.htklii.org; Re Moorgate Metals Ltd
[1995] 1 BCLC 503. Just as directors of insolvent companies may be disqualified for
their "unfitness to manage" under a prescribed set of circumstances, it is proposed that
controlling shareholders and directors of companies that "privatize on the cheap" be
similarly treated in view of their treatment of investors. The rationale is two-fold. First, it
is founded on the fact that the shareholders who provide the capital lose out simply by
placing their trust on others and not through any fault of their own. Second, the
regulatory framework should provide some effective deterrent to minimize the potential
abuse of corporate law.
181 See Press Release, Hong Kong Government, FS Appoints Expert Group to
Review Operation of the Securities and Futures Market Regulatory Structure (Sept. 26,
2003) (stating the terms of reference of the Expert Group and a brief vitae of its three
members), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200209/26/0926219.htm.
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recommendations in its report in March 2003, which were initially
welcomed by the government. 18
2
Enthusiasm waned, however, following rigorous objections
from various sectors of the financial industry, resulting in a further
round of consultation by the government. 18 3 On March 26, 2004,
the Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury released its
"Consultation Conclusions on Proposals to Enhance the
Regulation of Listing,'' 184 which sought to strike a balance between
the different interests. This has led to criticisms that the
government is not prepared to undertake substantive steps in order
to consolidate its standing as an international financial center.'85
While both interesting and important, these issues nonetheless
remain outside the scope of this paper and are better left for a
more detailed analysis in another forum.
The Main Board of the SEHK had a total market capitalization
of approximately HKD$5.5 trillion or some USD$703 billion as of
June 30, 2004.186 On this date, the market capitalization of its
three largest companies, HSBC Holdings plc, China Mobile (Hong
Kong) Limited, and Hutchison Whampoa Limited, was
approximately 35% of this number, while the aggregate for the top
fifty companies accounted for almost eighty percent. 187 Yet, the
market capitalization of its smallest company (Garron
International Limited) was a mere HKD$8.02 million or barely
182 See FIN. SECRETARY, REPORT BY THE EXPERT GROUP TO REVIEW THE OPERATION
OF THE SECURITIES & FUTURES MARKET REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2003), available at
www.info.gov.hk/info/expert/expertreport-e.htm.
183 See Gov'T OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION, CONSULTATION
CONCLUSIONS ON PROPOSALS TO ENHANCE THE REGULATION OF LISTING 10, available at
http://www.info.gov.hk/fstb/fsb/ppr/consult/doc/erlcon-e.pdf (last visited Sept. 24,
2004).
184 See id.
185 See, e.g., D-graded PERL of the Orient (Mar. 28, 2004) (discussing of the issues
that remain to be resolved on a satisfactory level), available at www.webb-site.com
/articlesiPERLdecision.htm.
186 See Stock Exchange Hong Kong Main Board (listing stock exchange data on
June 30, 2004), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/deta/merketstat/TV2004.htm (last
visited Oct. 8, 2004).
187 See generally HONG KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., TRADING
INFORMATION (2004), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/tradinfo.htm; HONG KONG
EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., DATA & STATISTICS (2004), available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/datastatistics.htm.
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over USD$1 million, a completely insignificant and miniscule
amount by any measure.188 No less than fifty-eight companies, or
almost 6.7% of the 869 companies that were listed on the SEHK,
had a market capitalization of less than HKD$100 million, the
minimum benchmark required at the point of their listing on the
SEHK. 8 9 These statistics should focus the attention of the
government and regulators to determine the type and quality of
market that Hong Kong should work towards achieving.
Turning to the specific issues raised in the delisting debate, it
is evident that the proposals as contained in Part C of the
Consultation Paper require further study.1 9° A number of its
principal deficiencies have been identified in this paper and
proposals for their rectification advanced. The government of the
HKSAR has consistently professed its aspiration to be the paragon
of corporate governance within the region, 9' but its actions
suggest a lack of political will and/or technical know-how to attain
this lofty objective. Ensuring that the proposals for the delisting of
shares are implemented properly with adequate protection of
minority shareholders is an essential requirement if the
government seeks to provide a stronger signal to facilitate the
further development of its financial markets.
By the same token, any mistakes, perceived or otherwise, will
result in declining confidence by investors because mistakes will
make the aspirations of the government appear unrealistic. With
188 TRADING INFORMATION, supra note 187 (providing trading information regarding
the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited); DATA & STATISTICS, supra note 187
(providing data and statistics regarding the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing
Limited).
189 This requirement was increased to HKD$200 million, or approximately
USD$25.6 million, as of March 31, 2004. See LISTING RULES, supra note 30, at 8.05(2).
Appendix I sets out the details of the eighty-four companies whose market capitalization
were below this amount and would therefore not have qualified to list on the SEHK had
their applications been submitted on or after March 31, 2004.
190 Despite a statement by the HKEx that it would release a revised proposal for
public consultation by October 2002, it has not materialized. HKEx placed the issue of
the delisting of penny stocks on the back burner as the spectacular corporate collapses of
Enron and WorldCom in the United States changed the present focus of the regulators to
corporate governance. See Press Release, HKEx Today Released Its Revised
Consultation Paper on Continuing Listing Criteria and Related Issues (Nov. 15, 2002), at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/2002.htm.
191 Tsang, supra note 135"
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the driving principles based upon the wider collective interests of
the various stakeholders within the financial markets rather than
being merely limited to the select few, the time to act is now.192
192 See Chee Kong Low, A Road Map for Corporate Governance in East Asia, 25
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. (forthcoming 2004).
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APPENDIX I
LIST OF POTENTIAL DELISTING CANDIDATES
AS REPORTED ON JUNE 30, 2004
Stock Stock Capitalization
Name of Company Priceb (HKm)'Code Pie (H m c
1226 GARRON INTERNATIONAL 0.1 8.02
339 EARNEST INVS. HDG. 0.024 8.64
401 401 HOLDINGS (March 28, 2003)* 0.03 11.01
657 G-VISION INTL.(HDG.) 0.03 14.55
905 HAYWOOD INVESTMENTS 0.085 14.69
204 EVEREST INTL. INVS. 0.045 15.98
922 VISION TECH INTL.HDG. (February 6, 2003)* 0.049 17.87
620 UDL HOLDINGS 0.02 18.71
1190 BAKER GROUP INTL.HDG. (August 26, 2002)* 0.036 19.17
726 SOUTH EAST GROUP 0.067 22.15
397 STARBOW HOLDINGS 0.035 25.75
90 GOLD WO INTL. (December 16, 2002)* 0.08 25.92
371 SHANG HUA HOLDINGS 0.024 26.65
2336 SUNLINK INTL.HDG. 0.058 27.43
a This column states the four digit stock code as assigned by the SEHK. See HONG
KONG EXCHANGES & CLEARING LTD., TRADING INFORMAITON: SECURITIES MARKET-
CLOSING PRICE CALCULATION, at www.hkex.com.hk/tradinfo/closepricecal/
closepricecal.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2004).
b This column states the closing prices of the shares as of June 30, 2004. All amounts
are expressed in Hong Kong Dollars. Hence the number "0.01" means HKD$0.01 or one
Hong Kong cent. Under a normal operating environment, the closing price of a share is
determined by the median of five nominal prices in the last minute of the trading hour for
the day. See id.
C This column states the market capitalization of the companies as at June 30, 2004. All
amounts are expressed in millions of Hong Kong Dollars. Hence, the number "8.02"
means HKD$8.02 million or about USD$1.03 million.
* This indicates that the trading of the share has been suspended. The date of
suspension is located in parentheses. Only companies for which trading has been
suspended on or before December 31, 2003 have been included as a requirement of the
present proposal to be effective for a period of at least six months.
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1139 VICTORY GROUP 0.027 29.03
993 SIMSEN INTERNATIONAL 0.078 32.18
313 DICKSON GROUP HDG. 0.046 35.51
327 SHANXI CENTRAL PHARM. (July 25, 2003)* 0.015 36.12
650 SHUN CHEONG HDG. 0.078 36.17
1095 SINOCAN HOLDINGS (June 24, 2002)* 0.044 37.38
254 ECYBERCHINA HOLDINGS (June 30, 2003)* 0.014 40.14
228 HON PO GP.(LOBSTER KING) 0.065 40.95
467 ORIENT RES. GP. 0.043 41.27
288 BERJAYA HOLDINGS (HK.) 0.071 41.96
1176 NAM FONG INTL.HDG. 0.031 42.16
901 RADFORD CAPITAL INV. 0.029 43.79
577 SKYNET (INTL.GP.) HDG. (October 16, 2003)* 0.01 45.07
916 FU CHEONG INTL.HDG. (December 16, 2002)* 0.038 45.6
501 RNA HOLDINGS (June 2, 2003)* 0.027 45.78
979 CHINA NAN FENG GP. 0.058 46.1
211 STYLAND HDG. 0.025 46.78
851 MAE HOLDINGS 0.014 47.64
1130 BENEFUN INTL.HDG. 0.045 50.94
385 CHINNEY ALLIANCE GP. 0.013 51.56
193 CAPITAL ESTATE 0.016 52.31
476 CHINA ELEGANCE (HDG.) 0.06 53
1013 PLUS HOLDINGS 0.04 55.65
305 MAGNUM INTL.HDG. 0.094 57.81
295 KONG SUN HOLDINGS 0.025 64.03
430 ORIENTAL EXPLORER HDG. 0.036 64.8
519 APPLIED INTL.HDG. 0.071 66.82
736 NORTHERN INTL. HDG. 0.014 67.65
720 WO KEE HONG HDG. 0.032 70.92
925 PEAKTOP INTL.HDG. 0.1 73.09
1003 CAPITAL PROSPER 0.06 76.71
729 GORIENT (HOLDINGS) 0.06 78.76
1141 XIN 0.072 79.4
689 GREAT WALL CYBERTECH (March 24, 2003)* 0.01 80.76
59 RENREN HOLDINGS 0.012 81.35
718 BESTWAY INTL. HDG. 0.029 82.68
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412 HERITAGE INTL.HDG. 0.031 86.55
559 FT HOLDINGS INTL. 0.034 88.1
353 JACKLEY HOLDINGS 0.071 88.39
990 THEME INTERNATIONAL HDG. 0.036 90.3
547 SUN INNOVATION HDG. 0.019 92.74
516 PYXIS GROUP 0.04 96
1191 CHINA RICH HOLDINGS 0.043 97.04
1046 UNIVERSE INTL.HDG. 0.06 97.48
651 WONSON INTL.HDG. 0.015 102.56
439 CLIMAX INTL. 0.027 105.64
155 REXCAPITAL INTL.HDG. 0.066 112.82
530 FORTUNA INTL. HDG. 0.011 113.59
835 WANJI PHARM.HDG. 0.021 114.29
491 RUILI HOLDINGS 0.011 116.76
70 MASSIVE RES.INTL. 0.013 118.06
542 MORNING STAR RES. 0.052 125.56
1218 EASYKNIT INTL.HDG. 0.099 131.04
555 REXCAPITAL FINL.HDG. 0.044 132
875 FIRST DRAGONCOM AGRO-STRATEGY HDG. 0.065 138.62
240 I-CHINA HDG. 0.018 140.65
115 GRAND FIELD GP. 0.07 143.27
276 NEW WORLD CYBERBASE 0.025 145.62
164 PREMIUM LAND 0.032 145.65
399 FAR EAST PHARM. TECH. 0.068 147.95
79 CENTURY LEGEND (HDG.) 0.072 148.68
479 CIL HOLDINGS 0.025 154.37
2362 GOLDIGIT ATOM-TECH HDG. 0.092 156.39
663 SWANK INTL. MNFG. 0.051 159.37
285 CHINA SPECIALISED FIBRE (November 26, 2002)* 0.089 165.54
767 PACIFIC PLYWOOD HDG. 0.032 178.59
262 DESON DEV.INTL.HDG. 0.039 180.94
261 CCT TECH INTL. 0.013 183.8
419 UNIVERSAL HOLDINGS 0.057 186.63
603 CHINA CITY NATURAL GAS 0.02 190.44
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